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This is a preliminary report based upon a
month of research primarily on secondary
sources deposited at the Malaysian National
Archives and the libraries of various govern-
ment departments. The report has been
prepared as background material for field
research to be conducted between April and
June 1988, during which empirical data on
the topic studied will be gathered.
It is relevant to note that the author has
previously conducted two years of intensive
fieldwork (1980-81) on "local politics and
rural development at the grassroots in
Malaysia" in a rural Malay community, and
during that period he examined briefly the
role of Village Development Committee
within the context of the larger topic studied.
In the present arid forthcoming research his
focus is solely on this village-level organiza-
tion.
This report consists of three parts. The
first part provides a brief note on rural de-
velopment in Malaysia. The second part out-
lines the evolution of Malaysia's rural devel-
opment administration. The final part exam-
ines the origins, organization and perform-
ance of the rural institution called Village
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Rural Development in Malaysia:
A Note
Rural development policy has been an
important component of planned develop-
ment in Malaysia. The phrase "rural de-
velopment," as used in Malaysia, connotes
both direct productivity-raising programmes
and efforts to improve infrastructure and
social services for consumption as well as
production. It has been mainly for the
Malays, the major ethnic group of Malaysia,
the majority of whom reside in the rural
areas as peasant prod ucers. They also form
the most important political group to the
ruling party, particularly UMNO (United
Malays National Organization), which has
been the dominant partner in the ruling
coalition, first known as Alliance and later
National Front. Without rural Malay sup-
port, UMNO would not exist. Hence, the
rural development policy is essentially aimed
at satisfying the desires of the rural Malay
electorate.
The highly political nature of rural de-
velopment programmes in Malaysia need
not be stressed here. Suffice it to note that
such programmes have even made the dis-
tribution of functions among cabinet minis-
ters a matter of great sensitivity. At the
grassroots, the presence or absence of rural
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development programmes often decides the
fate of an UMNO candidate in the state or
national general elections. It is imperative
for us then to examine what are the rural
development programmes, how they are im-
plemented, and the results.
In this report we begin our investigation
by examining the administrative history and
structure that have supported the whole rural
development programme in Malaysia. We
shall then look closely at the Village Devel-
opment Committee and its viability as a
rural organization.
The Evolution of Malaysia's Rural
Development Administration
The implementation and constant monitor-
ing of the numerous rural development
projects at the local level in Malaysia is not
an easy task. It has been both adminis-
tratively trying and politically difficult. To
cope with this daunting task the Malaysian
government has adopted a special strategy
called the "Operations Room Technique
(ORT)."
Historically, the ORT emerged from a
successful colonial military practice during
the Emergency period of 1948-60. During
that time, the government was conducting a
war against the communist insurgents which
involved not only destroying the insurgents
but also denying them the support of the
civilians. As a result, it was quite common
for entire village communities to be relocated
in order to cut off aid to the insurgents. To
undertake and coordinate this mammoth
task, close and effective coordination of
military, police and administrative personnel
was vital. Hence a War Council with an
Executive Committee was set up, with op-
erations rooms at the national, state, and
district levels.
The First Five-Year Malaya Plan of 1956-
60 was implemented at the height of the
Emergency period and not long after
Malaysia's first national general elections of
1955, both of which took place while
Malaysia was still under British rule. So,
the introduction of the ORT as a strategy
to bring about rural development, just a few
months before the Emergency ended in
July 1960, was considered most appropriate
by those in power. In short, what was
suitable for the war against the insurgents
was also suitable, for the "war" against
"rural backwardness."
The ORT for development consists organ-
izationally of four central elements, namely,
the Committee System, the Operation
Room, the RED Book Plan, and the Briefing
Method and Field Inspection. The Com-
mittee System followed closely the pattern
of the War Council Executive Committee,
whereby a hierarchy of committees was set
up at the national, state, and district levels;
and to this was added a committee at the
village level. These committees and their
members play the role of planners, adminis-
trators, implementors and evaluators. Opera-
tion Rooms are physically set up at the
national, state, district and village levels and
t here maps, graphs, pictures and charts
showing the location, details and progress of
each rural development project are displayed
prominently and often colourfully.
The RED Book Plan is alarge book literally
(2 1/2 feet by 3 feet in size) containing de-
tailed outlines of all the projects under im-
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plementation at each committee level. It is
red because RED stands for Rural Economic
Development; red is regarded as a very
lucky colour, and the RED Book represents
the antithesis of "red-tape." The Briefing
Method and Field Inspection is essentially a
feedback-seeking and evaluating mechanism.
Ministers and high-ranking civil servants
conduct regular field inspections and hold
regular briefings in the Operation Rooms
to take stock, to diagnose the causes of any
delays that may have occurred in develop-
ment projects listed in the RED Book Plan,
and to prescribe on-the-spot remedies.
Through this exercise a higher level of
coordination between the various parties in-
volved in the implementation of the develop-
ment projects is achieved.
The rural development projects listed in
the RED Book Plan include the following:
the construction of minor roads and bridges;
land development; water supplies; proces-
sing and marketing facilities for rural pro-
d ucers; rural industries; school; health
centres and playing fields; irrigation for
rice areas; minor irrigation work; river
clearing; electricity and telecommunications;
mosques and surau (small prayer houses);
bus and bicycle stands; cooperative develop-
ment; and numerous other minor projects.
Nat all of these projects are listed in all the
RED Book Plans in Operation Rooms
located across the country. All projects,
however, have long-term and short-term
objectives. The short-term ones are meant
to create visible signs of progress and are
thus called "development covercrop" pro-
jects. The long-term ones are meant to raise
levels of prod uctivity, to increase employ-
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ment opportunities, and ultimately to eradi-
cate poverty in the rural areas.
The RED Book Plan of the ORT received
wide publicity when it was first announced.
Local newspapers held RED Book essay
contests; university students produced a
BLDE Book, in which they listed sugges-
tions to improve rural life that complemented
the content of the RED Book; and various
business associations followed with their own
book plans but the colours were not specified.
The ORT and its RED Book Plan con-
tinued to dominate the implementation of
rural development projects under the Second
Five-Year Malaya Plan of 1961-65. The re-
sults were encouraging indeed, at least for
the short-term projects, which mainly con-
cerned infrastructure. For example, the rural
roads increased from 250 miles of new roads
in the 1956-60 period, to 2,060 miles in the
1961-65 period. Similar phenomenal in-
creases were achieved in other infrastructure
projects. If these short-term projects were
meant to create visible signs of progress, the
government has achieved more than it ex-
pected. The implication of this achievement
at the grassroots level is important to the role
of the Village Development Committee,
which we shall examine shortly.
When the First Malaysia Plan of 1966-70
was launched, the RED Book Plan com-
ponent of the ORT was phased out be-
cause it had achieved its main objective of
providing the so-called "development cover-
crop." Although the successful creation of
these construction projects was important, it
did not bring about the total rural develop-
ment that the government had in mind. The
government then felt that there was an
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urgent need to educate the people to use
these new amenities and, even more impor-
tant, to encourage the rural population to
participate in government's efforts to help
them.
Therefore, to replace the RED Book Plan
of the ORT, the government introduced a
series of "sloganeering and change-aware-
ness" campaigns. This was essentially, a
"preconditioning process" to achieve
"modernization." During the Emergency
period, similar military campaigns were
categorised as psychological warfare strate-
gies. The military idiom "operations" con-
tinued to be used to designate the various
sloganeering and change-awareness cam-
paigns.
The first In the series, launched in 1966,
was called "Operation Progress" (Gerakan
Maju). Its emphasis was on group action
to effect community development. The
vehicle for the process was the Village
Development Committe. Through this
Committee the various activities of such
village-level organizations as cooperatives,
youth clubs, cultural groups and PTAs were
"coordinated horizontally" to generate a vil-
lage esprit de corps. A number of village-
level competitions in agricultural prod uction,
handicrafts, and building a "model village"
were conducted so that the rural people
could be guided by demonstration and would
compete for progress.
The second programme, launched in
1968 and called "Operation Self-help"
(GerakanJayadirl), mainly aimed at individ-
ual self-improvement and was productivity-
oriented. This was quite different from the
earlier "Operation Progress," which was
group-action based and community improve-
ment-oriented. The third one, implemented
In 1972, that is, during the Second
Malaysia Plan of 1971-75, was called "Op-
eration Renewal" (Gerakan Pembaharuan).
The call was for village-level social and eco-
nomic improvements through community
development efforts. It was very similar to
the "Operation Progress" in its aim but
was implemented in a period just after the
bloody May 13 1969 racial riot. The new
campaign could be viewed as an effort by
the government to reassure the Malay rural
voters that they were not forgotten or ne-
glected. It was a "renewal" effort both for
the government and for rural folk.
For various economic and political reasons,
this series of campaigns replacing The RED
Book Plan seemed to have little impact,
as the massive peasant and student demon-
strations of 1974 showed. A special White
Paper was tabled in Parliament in 1975 to
explain why the demonstrations took place.
This was despite the countrywide imple-
mentation of the Adult Education and Com-
munity Development Program to create
"development literacy," and the establish-
ment of the Malaysian Centre for Develop-
ment Studies to train both "officers of de-
velopment" and the "leaders of the recipients
of development" in rudimentary sociology
and psychology.
Thus, in 1975, a GREEN Book Plan was
introduced with all the paraphernalia of the
RED Book Plan. This time the aim was
not to provide a "development covercrop."
Instead, it was literally meant to increase
the cultivation and production of food crops
to meet the needs of the nation. At the
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same time, such activities would supplement
the income of the rural people, especially
those who had been solely dependent on
cash crops, particularly rubber, for their
livelihood. It was thus hoped to reduce the
pressure of the staggering inflation in the
country, which had affected rural people
badly. In other words, if the RED Book
Plan of the ORT was to fight, amongst
other things, peasant land hunger, the
GREEN Book Plan was to prevent the
peasants from suffering real hunger.
Whether the GREEN Book Plan
succeeded or failed remains a mystery to
this day. N either official report nor aca-
demic study is available for us to assess its
performance. Perhaps it has been lost
amongst the host of other major development
efforts of the 1970s which were overtly di-
rected towards the expansion of Malay
entrepreneurs and the Malay urban middle
class. There were carried out under the
now famous bumt'pUlera (lit. prince of the
soil) policy of the NEP.
With the implementation of this policy, the
focus of attention and development efforts in
the rural areas has shifted from agricultural
cultivators to rural entrepreneurs. The
former constitute the majority of the rural
Malay population. With this shift come
changes in the general administrative struc-
ture of development administration in rural
Malaysia. The changes are meant to facili-
tate the implementation of the various gov-
ernment development programmes under
the bumiputera policy.
The impact of such changes at the district
level has been great. Although the ORT is
still adopted in the implementation of the
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development projects, the control of the
district development machinery, including
the ORT, has changed hands from local
bureaucrats to local politicians, the
wakz1 rakyat (lit. people's representatives;
namely, State Legislative Assembly members
and members of Parliament). The dominance
of the local politicians is further enhanced
by the fact that many local bureaucrats
of both hi gh and low rank have become
partisans, openly belonging to the ruling
UMNO party organization. Hence they are
under the control of the top local politicians,
that is, the wakil rakyat, not only within
their local party organization but also in the
district development machinery itself. As a
result, the district development machinery,
which controls and monitors every aspect of
the implementation of all district develop-
ment projects under the bumiputera policy,
has now become an integral part of the local
ruling party apparatus. The political and
economic implications of this pattern for the
process of distribution of development ben-
efits at different levels within the district are
far-reaching.
One of the obvious implications of this
trend is manifested clearly in the political
sphere. Intense internal political strife within
local UMNO organizations has developed
almost all over the country. The contest
for official positions within UMNO local or-
ganizations has been vicious, and outbreaks
of violence at annual meetings have been on
the rise. Many local politicians have become
rich overnight in the "business of develop-
ment" under the bumiputera policy, which
enables them to buy continued political
support with hard cash and has led to the
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rise of "money politics." Factional politics
have become more overt and widespread
both at the national as well as the local
level. This reached a height recently, when
the UMNO President, Mahathir Mohamed,
who is also Malaysia's Prime Minister, was
seriously challenged in the national UMNO
elections in April 1987 and won very nar-
rowly.
Realizing that a "revolution of rising ex-
pectations" is taking place amongst rural
Malays, who provide the bulk of UMNO's
support, the government (read UMNO) has
made many "peace offerings." One of these
was the launching of RED Book Plan II in
late 1987. The objective of the new RED
Book does not differ much from that of the
original one launched almost thirty years
ago. The lack of basic amenities (e.g. piped
water, electricity, etc.) remains a central
problem to be resolved by the RED Book
Plan II. This implies that despite the
provision of infrastructural facilities, many
parts of the rural areas have been neglected.
This is not at all surprising, because the
emphasis of rural development from the
mid-1970s has been on the creation of
opportunities for rural Malay entrepreneurs,
who form a small proportion of the rural
population. Although the rest of the rural
folks have not been totally neglected, it is
the meteoric rise of the few rural entrepre-
neurs as local nouveaux riches which creates
the feeling of being "left out," "short-
changed" and "taken for a ride" amongst
the majority of rural folk. This was the
reason behind the serious UMNO internal
strife in 1987, which has since worsened.
It is against this background that one has
to locate the establishment of the Village
Development Committee, in which the con-
cept of "village" is clearly a state-imposed
social construct to facilitate economic and
political control of the rural folks upon
whom the political survival of the ruling
party, and Malaysia, too, depends. We shall
now examine briefly the origins, organization




The setting up of the War Council and its
Executive Committee by the colonial govern-
ment during the Emergency period of 1948-
60 was in effect an exercise in overt political
control and a convenient administrative cen-
tralization through the use of military force
without military rule. One of the more
successful outcomes of the whole exercise
was the massive, countrywide village reloca-
tion programme, under which an equally
successful "re-education and rehabilitation"
scheme for the communist sympathizers
amongst the villagers was also implemented.
It is significant to note here that most of
these villagers were Chinese-an important
sociological consideration 111 Malaysia's
context.
It came as no suprise, therefore, when the
concept of the War Council Executive Com-
mittee was adopted almost in toto by the
post-independence government to implement
its rural development programme. This
time, however, it was the Malay rather than
Chinese villagers whom the government had
to bring into line. They were not relocated,
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but their social life was reorganized and
reconstituted to suit the government's prevail-
ing interests. Hence the setting up of the
Village Development Committee (VDC),
which was absent in the administrative
structure of the War Council, became an
important component of the Committee Sys-
tem of the new development initiatives.
This began to be instituted by the national
government under the Second Five-Year
Malaya Plan of 1961-65, that is, during the
RED Book Plan period. VDCs were to
replace the ketua kampung (village head-
man) with a "democratically elected" commit-
tee of from eleven to fifteen members.
Each mukt·m (subdistrict) in the district was
to have at least one such committee. The
government even built "community halls" to
be used by the VDCs as their bases or
operation rooms.
The aim of this change was to increase
the ability of the district administration to
mobilize local initiative in community devel-
opment effort. The central government saw
the VDCs as an instrument for: harnessing
villagers' energy for their own social and
economic development; developing their
awareness of agriculture, health and small-
scale industrial development; working up
development programmes for villages on a
gotong-royong (self-help) basis; providing
effective leadership and building confidence
for income-producing projects; modernizing
villagers' attitudes; encouraging efficient use
of government input and promoting coopera-
tion with government departments; acting
for liaison at the district level and submit-
ting progress reports, while at the same time
ensuring the implementation of directives
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and orders of the District Rural Develop-
ment Committee. In short, government
wanted the people to work together on
common projects, thus developing a sense of
community or "kampungness"-an effort at
local "social engineering."
The VDCs are supposed to be popularly
elected, with committee members serving for
two years. They are supposed to meet
monthly to discuss village development and
petition the district administration regarding
development projects and issues. Actually
committees do not meet monthly, do not
communicate regularly with district officers,
and often try to press their petitions di-
rectly with wakil rakyat or other influential
local politicians. Nor are the committees
actually "popularly elected." Mukim influ-
entials propose the slate of candidates, who
are then either appointed by district officers
or "elected" by consensus at a public meet-
ing called and run by the mukim influen-
tials who set up the slate. Hence members
of opposition parties or their sympathizers
are excluded from most of the VDCs.
The Assistant District Officer (ADO) for
Rural and Community Development is the
key figure at the district level. He screens
communications from the VDCs and writes
memoranda to relevant agencies of govern-
ment. He has only a small amount of dis-
cretionary funds to be used mostly for main-
tenance of roads, bridges, mosques etc. in
the district. This means that the vast
majority of the petitions of the VDCs
cannot be fulfilled at all, much less in a
reasonably short time. The VDC will peti-
tion over and over again for something it
considers important and get virtually
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nowhere. The ADO for Rural Development
must carefully spread what he is alloted so
as to make sure all the mukim get some-
thing every once in a while. It is not in
his best interests to meet often with the
VDCs or let them press too much on him.
Since VDC meetings often are held in the
evenings after his office hours, such meetings
can frequently be avoided unless some abso-
lutely pressing issue is on the agenda.
With regard to large projects done by
government agencies, for example, water
supply, electricity, big bridges, schools, irri-
gation, etc., the agencies have their own
timetable for those activities and do not
really respond to petitioning from below,
such as from the VDCs.
The VDCs have, since 1975, had an
"S" added to their acronym, to signify a new
extra function: security. Hence it is now
known as the Village Development and
Security Committee (VDSC). The govern-
ment has also initiated RELA or vigilante
corps to oversee village security and to act
as their "eyes and ears" in the villages.
Members of this corps receive para-military
training and each has been issued with a
shot-gun. But whether this "S" is added
or not makes very little difference; the
VDSC is not viable or effective because of
it.
Government reports and other studies
have pointed out that, operationally, the
VDSCs throughout Malaysia have suffered
many shortcomings. The main one relates
to the ineffectiveness of its leadership. Be-
cause all village heads and committee mem-
bers are "government appointees" and their
names are recommended by local politicians,
they often lack leadership qualities, skills or
proven acceptability to the villagers. They
are mainly party sympathizers or cronies of
local politicians.
Besides that, the post of village head is
an honorary one, not that of a paid civil
servant. He may be a peasant, taxi-driver,
or a religious teacher. Therefore, he per-
forms the tasks of village head on a part-
time basis and receives a small allowance of
about M$ 400 (about US $160) a year. This
is hardly a great incentive. The committee
members are not paid at all.
However, the village heads and the com-
mittee members are expected to know what
is happening in their village, although they
are not vested with any authority over their
areas of responsibility. They have no en-
forcement powers and, therefore, can only
advise people and seek their cooperation.
They are often confused by the endless flow
of concepts and slogans from the top, and yet
they are supposed to disseminate these ideas
to the local folks and to seek their partici-
pation.
The VDSC IS often at a loss to under-
stand whether the "RED Book Plan" or the
"GREEN Book Plan" is aimed towards
self-sufficiency or market prod uction. When
there is surplus prod uction, there is no
market for it. Some villagers h~ve ex-
hausted their pieces of land but they are not
able to obtain new pieces to participate
fully in the implementation of projects under
the RED or GREEN Book Plans.
As a result, many VDSCs exist only on
record and in reality have become defunct.
Therefore, community halls, the hallmark of
Malaysia's developmental initiative at the
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local level, have become empty and run
down. Many have turned into "meeting"
places for cows, goats and local juvenile de-
linquents.
It is not surprising at all that, since 1980,
the economic role of the VDSC has been de-
emphasised and its political role stressed
more than before. Hence it only maintains
its function in rural government. Many of
its economic functions have been taken over
by other government-organized local organi-
zations, such as the Farmers' Cooperative, or
the local branches of national statutory bod-
ies, such as the Rubber Industry Smallholder
Development Authority (RISDA) and the
Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabil-
itation Authority (FELCRA).
In an effort to turn the VDSC into an
effective political organization the govern-
ment (read the ruling party) has, in some
states, made it mandatory for a village head
to become the chairperson of the U M N0
branch in his village, or the UMNO branch
chief of the village to take over the village
headship once the services of the incumbent
have been terminated by the government,
often immediately. The aim of this change
is to enable the village head to farm out
party funds, in cash or in kind, to reward
"helpful and useful" villagers. This is nec-
essary to complement the little "crusts of de-
velopment pies," which are usually not
enough to buy continued local political sup-
port. With this dual function, the village
head is in a better position to mobilize the
villagers for both official and party political
activities.
Although the VDSC runs the village ad-
ministration, it is often the local Community
226
Development Organization or K EMAS
which provides the organizational and politi-
cal support that the VDSC lacks. KEMAS
is a government department, called the
Department of Community Development,
under the Ministry of National and
Rural Development. Its activities fall into
two broad categories. Firstly, activities that
are economic in nature, such as small-
scale poultry farming, production of handi-
crafts for sale, tailoring and furniture-
making. Secondly, those that are educational
and vocational in nature, such as running
domestic science classes for women, reli gious
classes, literacy classes, pre-school classes,
motor-repair classes and leadership courses.
KEMAS provides professional staff for all
the activities and they are all Malays. Most
of the staff serving in a particular area come
from the villages of the area. Unlike other
civil servants, the staff of KEMAS are
allowed to participate actively in party po-
litical (read UMNO) activities. In other
words, all KEMAS staff simultaneously
serve the government and UMNO. It is in
this sense KEMAS complements VDSC
at the village level.
Therefore, it is not uncommon for VDSC
members to be recruited from the local
KEMAS staff. The latter also actively
recruit new members for UMNO. Like
the RELA members, they too serve as the
"ears and eyes" for the government and
provide up-to-date information to higher au-
thorities about all the happenings in the
village. Herein lies the virtue of having
locals as staff of KEMAS. Since they re-
side in their own villages, amongst their
close family and friends, they are ideal in-
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formers. They operate without raising the
SUspIcIon of the people they are observing.
The authorities can therefore very quickly
suppress any form of opposition before it
spreads or gains momentum, once they have
obtained information from KEMAS staff.
The same staff are usually mobilized during
general elections, mainly conducting house-
to-house campaigns under the guise of family
visits, or campaigning at the various classes
and activities of KEMAS. In short, nobody
in any Malay village in rural Malaysia today
escapes the eyes of the higher authorities,
particularly if he or she is involved in activ-
ities considered detrimental to the interests
of the government. The retribution from the
government for "unwanted elements" or in-
dividuals "threatening national security" is
swift and often severe, but never made
public. Recent political events in Malaysia
provide ample evidence of this.
Besides KEMAS, there are at least three
other voluntary organizations which playa
supporting socio-political role to VDSC,
namely, the Youth Associations, Mosque
Committee and Death/Funeral Charity As-
sociation (Persatuan Khairat Kematian).
N one of them surpasses KEMAS in its
contribution, but each of them provides
what KEMAS does not offer: for example,
the Death/Funeral Charity Association caters
for the funeral expenses of all members
within the village and often for villagers
who are non-members too. Such expenses
could be costly for the village poor. The
Youth Club, often together with the local
UMNO Youth Wing, caters mainly to the
needs of unemployed youths. Some of
their activities overlap with KEMAS.
Though at most times the Mosque Commit-
tee plays the role of caretaker of the local
mosque and cemetary, it is KEMAS that
conduets religious classes, mostly at the
mosque, and with the cooperation of the
Mosque Committee. Therefore, together
these voluntary organizations and KEMAS
help to create and sustain a much-needed
village consciousness, and there by lend legit-
imacy to VDSC. The absence or the lack
of support from these organizations often
leads to a VDSC becoming defunct.
Conclusion
This report provides the necessary back-
drop to a more detailed empirical, village-
based study on the Village Development
Committee, not only for the author but
also for those interested in this particular
rural organization. It does not pretend to be
an exhaustive survey of rural development
in Malaysia or of the Village Development
Committee. But it does cover those areas
previously neglected by other researchers
who have studied the Village Development
Committee. It is hoped that after the forth-
coming extended field research a more ex-
citing description of the Village Develop-
ment Committee in action could be presented
as a final report of the whole research
project.
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